基于演化博弈视角的政府预算博弈模型设计及分析

针对政府预算体系,由于部门采取的行为策略是基于有限理性而做出的,所以博弈双方的策略选择实际上是不断调整的,并且是根据对方策略的变化而不断变化的。因此,运用演化博弈工具来研究政政府预算体系更符合现实情况。基于此,从演化博弈理论的研究视角探讨了预算审批部门、预算申报部门和财政支出部门决策的演化过程,建立了预算审批部门和预算申报部门以及财政支出部门之间的演化博弈模型。分析了审批部门、申报部门和支出部门的行为特征,根据复制者动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略。最后,文章通过数值算例对结论进行了论证。

Model Design and Analysis of Government Budget Basedon Evolutionary Game Theory

For the government budget system,the departments’ strategy is taken based on the finite rational,so,the bilateral strategies is actually continuously adjusted,Therefore,it is more realistic for us to study government budget system with evolutionary game.Evolution between budget approval department and reporting departments(or between spending departments)is discussed from the perspective of evolutionary game theory,and the evolutionary game model is also established.Behavioral characteristics of approval department,reporting departments and spending departments are analyzed;behavior evolutionary law and evolutionary stable strategy are given according to dynamic equation.Finally,this paper proves the conclusion with a numerical example.