Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology |
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Authors: | Jared Bates |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Indiana University Southeast, 4201 Grant Line Rd, 47150 New Albany, IN |
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Abstract: | The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological
theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman,
1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium
test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified
belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one
epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification
are in fact in reflective equilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will
argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory
choices in empirical sciences. If reflective equilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it
cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology. |
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Keywords: | reflective equilibrium underdetermination methodology naturalism theory of justification intuition |
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