| Abstract: | ABSTRACT. Limiting adverse consequences of fishing on essential fish habitat has emerged as a key fishery management objective. The conventional approach to providing habitat protection is to create MPAs or marine reserves that prohibit all or certain types of fishing in specific areas. However, there may be more cost‐effective and flexible ways to provide habitat protection. We propose an individual habitat quota (IHQ) system for habitat conservation that would utilize economic incentives to achieve habitat conservation goals cost‐effectively. Individual quotas of habitat impact units (HIU) would be distributed to fishers with an aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock.” HIU use would be based on a proxy for marginal habitat damage. We use a dynamic, explicitly spatial fishery and habitat simulation model to explore how such a system might work. We examine how outcomes are affected by spatial heterogeneity in the fishery and the scale of habitat regulation. We find that the IHQ system is a highly cost‐effective means of ensuring a given level of habitat protection, but that spatial heterogeneity and the scale of regulation can have significant effects on the distribution of habitat protection. |
