A note on correlated equilibrium |
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| Authors: | Fe. S. Evangelista T. E. S. Raghavan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of Wisconsin Centers-Marathon, 518 South 7th Ave, 54401, Wausau, WI, USA
2. Department of Mathematics Statistics and Computer Science, The University of Illinois at Chicago, 322 Science and Engineering Offices, 60607-7045, Chicago, IL, USA
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| Abstract: | The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. |
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