The consistency principle for games in strategic form |
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Authors: | Bezalel Peleg Stef Tijs |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904, Jerusalem, Israel 2. Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, 5000LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands
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Abstract: | We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency, and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games. |
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