Attack on Han et al.’s ID-based confirmer (undeniable) signature at ACM-EC’03 |
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Authors: | Fangguo Zhang Reihaneh Safavi-Naini Willy Susilo |
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Institution: | aDepartment of Electronics and Communication Engineering, School of Information Science and Technology, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 510275, P.R. China bSchool of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia |
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Abstract: | In ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC’03), Han et al. Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curves, in: Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce Citation 2003, San Diego, CA, USA, June 09–12, 2003, pp. 262–263] proposed an ID-based confirmer signature scheme using pairings (the scheme is in fact an ID-based undeniable signature scheme). In this paper, we show that this signature scheme is not secure and the signer can deny any signature, even if it is a valid signature, and any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to the verifier. |
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Keywords: | Confirmer signature Undeniable signature Attack Bilinear pairings ID-based cryptography |
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