首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states
Authors:Immanuel M Bomze  Eric E C van Damme
Institution:(1) Department for Statistics and Computer Science, University of Vienna, Universitätsstrasse 5, A-1010 Wien, Austria;(2) CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abstract:Evolutionary stability, the central solution concept in evolutionary game theory, is closely related to local asymptotic stability in a certain nonlinear dynamical system operating on the state space, the so-called "replicator dynamics". However, a purely dynamical characterization of evolutionary stability is not available in an elementary manner. This characterization can be achieved by investigating so-called "derived games" which consist of mixed strategies corresponding to successful states in the original game. Using well-known facts, several characterization results are obtained within this context. These also may shed light on the extremality properties of evolutionary stability.
Keywords:Asymptotic stability  evolutionary games  mixed strategies  polymorphisms  replicator dynamics  stable sets
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号