Concept nativism and the rule following considerations |
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Authors: | M J Cain |
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Institution: | 1. Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford Brookes University, OX2 9AT, Oxford, United Kingdom
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Abstract: | In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate
a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the
stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments.
For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts
by constructing prototypes. This should lead us to abandon our general default hostility to concept nativism and be much more
sceptical of claims made on behalf of learning theories. |
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