Non-cooperative stochastic dominance games |
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Authors: | Prof P C Fishburn |
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Institution: | 1. The Pennsylvania State University, 310L Business Administration Building, 16802, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA
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Abstract: | A non-cooperative stochastic dominance game is a non-cooperative game in which the only knowledge about the players' preferences and risk attitudes is presumed to be their preference orders on the set ofn-tuples of pure strategies. Stochastic dominance equilibria are defined in terms of mixed strategies for the players that are efficient in the stochastic dominance sense against the strategies of the other players. It is shown that the set of SD equilibria equals all Nash equilibria that can be obtained from combinations of utility functions that are consistent with the players' known preference orders. The latter part of the paper looks at antagonistic stochastic dominance games in which some combination of consistent utility functions is zero-sum over then-tuples of pure strategies. |
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