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Manifolds of multi-leader Cournot equilibria
Authors:Andreas Ehrenmann
Affiliation:Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK
Abstract:We show that the known uniqueness results for leader-follower Cournot games with multiple but identical leaders hinge on the tacit assumption that identical leaders make identical decisions. We illustrate that without this assumption multi-leader Cournot games may well possess nontrivial manifolds of equilibria and discuss the underlying reasons.
Keywords:Multiple leader follower games   Non-uniqueness of equilibria
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