| 科技投入的博弈分析模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 王来生.科技投入的博弈分析模型[J].数理统计与管理,2005,24(1):109-111. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王来生 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国农业大学,北京,100083 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文把博弈论应用于科技投入分析,利用博弈论的委托—代理理论构造了一个委托—代理激励模型,研究中央对地方科技投入的激励机制,并针对委托人和代理人的不同风险情况进行了分析,讨论了对地地方政府科技投入激励的必要性。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 期望效用 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-1566(2005)01-0109-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年3月16日 |
The Analysis Model of Game Theory for Scientific and Technological Investment |
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| WANG Lai-sheng.The Analysis Model of Game Theory for Scientific and Technological Investment[J].Application of Statistics and Management,2005,24(1):109-111. |
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| Authors: | WANG Lai-sheng |
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| Abstract: | Game Theory is applied to scientific and technological in vestment in this paper,and using the theory of principal-agent sets up a principal-agent incentive model. An incentive mechanism which the central government supports the local government on scientific and technological investment is studied. The risksof principal and agent are analyzed respectively and the necessary of the incentive mechanism is discussed. |
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| Keywords: | Game theory expected utility incentive mechanism |
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