Pricing problems with a continuum of customers as stochastic Stackelberg games |
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| Authors: | P B Luh T S Chang T Ning |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut;(2) Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California, Davis, California;(3) Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut |
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| Abstract: | The pricing problem where a company sells a certain kind of product to a continuum of customers is considered. It is formulated as a stochastic Stackelberg game with nonnested information structure. The inducible region concept, recently developed for deterministic Stackelberg games, is extended to treat the stochastic pricing problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a pricing scheme to be optimal are derived, and the pricing problem is solved by first delineating its inducible region, and then solving a constrained optimal control problem.The research work reported here as supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECS-81-05984, Grant ECS-82-10673, and by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under AFOSR Grant 80-0098. |
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| Keywords: | Stackelberg games stochastic games pricing problems nonnested information multiperson optimization |
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