Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core |
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Authors: | Francesc Llerena Carles Rafels |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Business Administration, Rovira i Virgili University, Avda. Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain;(2) Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics and CREB, University of Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain |
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Abstract: | This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative
game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness
(from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity.
Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and
superadditive games.
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Keywords: | Cooperative TU-game Core Undominated imputations Reasonable outcomes |
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