Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation

Games with restricted cooperation describe situations in which the players are not completely free in forming coalitions. The restrictions in coalition formation can be attributed to economic, hierarchical, political or ethical reasons. In order to manage these situations, the model includes a collection of coalitions which determines the feasible agreements among the agents. The purpose of this paper is to extend the characterization of the core of a cooperative game, made by Peleg International Journal of Game Theory 15 (1986) 187–200; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. I. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., pp. 397–412] to the context of games with restricted cooperation. In order to make the approach as general as possible, we will consider classes of games with restricted cooperation in which the collection of feasible coalitions has a determined structure, and we will impose conditions on that structure to generalize the Peleg’s axiomatization.