On the saddle-point stability for a class of dynamic games |
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Authors: | E J Dockner H Takahashi |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada;(2) Department of Economics, Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we study the stability properties of the class of capital accumulation games introduced by Fershtman and Muller (Ref. 1). Both discrete and continuous time versions are discussed. It is shown that the open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions for both games are characterized by a general saddle-point property, a result best known from the turnpike literature in optimal growth theory. In the case of zero discount rates, an even stronger result can be derived: As long as the Hessian matrix of the instantaneous profit functions has a quasidominant diagonal, no pure imaginary roots are possible.The authors thank J. Boyd III, G. Feichtinger, S. Jørgensen, and G. Schwann for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Grant No. OGP-0037342. |
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Keywords: | Saddle-point stability differential games Nash equilibrium solutions capital accumulation games |
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