基于合作博弈的非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险应急金融服务供应链协调 |
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引用本文: | 马树建,张丽丽,司徒再云. 基于合作博弈的非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险应急金融服务供应链协调[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2014, 0(12) |
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作者姓名: | 马树建 张丽丽 司徒再云 |
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作者单位: | 南京工业大学经济与管理学院;南京工业大学理学院; |
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基金项目: | 国家自然科学基金青年项目(41101509);国家自然科学基金(71071075);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(12YJC630290);2012年地方高校国家级大学生创新创业训练计划(201210291034);2012年江苏省高等学校大学生实践创新训练计划重点项目(2012JSSPITP0898) |
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摘 要: | 根据非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险的特点,从服务供应链视角,提出非常规突发极端洪水灾害风险应急金融服务供应链的管理框架,分析此供应链的结构和内涵.分析此应急金融服务供应链中各参与人的利益关系式与和谐阈值,利用合作博弈理论,建立基于传统Shapley值合作博弈模型,有效解决应急金融服务供应链中成员经营性政府、保险公司和公众三者之间的协调问题.
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关 键 词: | 非常规突发极端洪水灾害 金融服务供应链 合作博弈 shapley值 协调 |
The Coordination of Emergency Financial Service Supply Chain for Unconventional Extreme Flood Disaster Risk Based on Cooperative Game Theory |
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Abstract: | This paper puts forward the emergency financial service supply chain management framework for unconventional extreme flood risk from the point of the service supply chain according to the character of the unconventional extreme flood risk.We analyze the structure and the connotation of this service supply chain.The benefit relationships of the partner and the harmony value have been discussed.This paper gives the cooperative game model based on Shapley Value in order to solve the coordination of this service supply chain. |
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Keywords: | unconventional extreme flood risk financial service supply chain cooperative game theory shapley value coordination |
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