Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in flocks |
| |
| Authors: | Zhuo Chen Jianxi GaoYunze Cai Xiaoming Xu |
| |
| Institution: | a Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, Chinab University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, Chinac Shanghai Academy of Systems Science, Shanghai, China |
| |
| Abstract: | We investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at which agents move, we find that cooperation can not only be maintained in such a system but there exists an optimal size of interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move, cooperation can even be enhanced by the mobility of individuals, provided that the velocity and the size of neighborhood are not too large. Besides, we find that the system exhibits aggregation behavior, and cooperators may coexist with defectors at equilibrium. |
| |
| Keywords: | Cooperation Flocks Evolutionary games Prisoner&rsquo s dilemma |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
