Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity |
| |
| Authors: | Mohamed Belhaj Frédéric Deroian |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Business Administration and Economics, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany;(2) Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany;(3) Institute of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Graz, Graz, Austria |
| |
| Abstract: | This article examines individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze the relationship between efforts and centrality on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of ordinal centrality. We first show that in both dominant and dominated equilibria central agents exert more effort. Second, we explore the issue of social coordination induced by our game. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
