Reliabilism and Brains in Vats |
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Authors: | Jon Altschul |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Loyola University-New Orleans, 413 Bobet Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA |
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Abstract: | According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the
subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as
facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists
argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because
these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism seems unable to account for the strong intuition
that these subjects’ beliefs are nonetheless justified. I think these considerations do not at all help the internalist cause.
I argue that by appealing to the anti-individualistic nature of perception, it can be shown that skeptical scenarios provide
no reason to prefer internalism to externalism. |
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