Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures |
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Authors: | Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov Vladimir A. Bulavsky Nataliya I. Kalashnykova Felipe J. Castillo |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Experimental Economics, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI), Nakhimovskiy prospect 47, Moscow 117418, Russia;2. Higher School of Economics (HSE), Myasnitskaya st. 20, Moscow 101000, Russia;3. Department of Systems and Industrial Engineering (IIS), ITESM, Campus Monterrey, av. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Monterrey, Nuevo León 64849, Mexico;4. Physics and Mathematics Department (FCFM), Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL), Cd. Universitaria, Pedro de Alba S/N, San Nicolás de los Garza, Nuevo León 66450, Mexico |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we consider a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE). The agents’ conjectures concern the price variations depending upon their production output’s increase or decrease. We establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium (called an exterior equilibrium) for any set of feasible conjectures. To introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium, we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures (referred to as influence coefficients) and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (understood as a CVE with consistent conjectures). To prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non-differentiable demand functions, we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function’s derivative with respect to the market price. |
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Keywords: | Game theory Conjectural variations equilibrium Consistent conjectures |
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