Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games |
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Authors: | David Housman |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Mathematics, Goshen College, 1700 South Main Street, Goshen, IN 46526, USA (e-mail: dhousman@goshen.edu), US |
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Abstract: | A partially defined cooperative game is a coalition function form game in which some of the coalitional worths are not known.
An application would be cost allocation of a joint project among so many players that the determination of all coalitional
worths is prohibitive. This paper generalizes the concept of the Shapley value for cooperative games to the class of partially
defined cooperative games. Several allocation method characterization theorems are given utilizing linearity, symmetry, formulation
independence, subsidy freedom, and monotonicity properties. Whether a value exists or is unique depends crucially on the class
of games under consideration.
Received June 1996/Revised August 2001 |
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Keywords: | : allocation method value cooperative game axioms incomplete information |
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