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Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with self-inhibition
Authors:Frank Emmert-Streib
Institution:Computational Biology and Machine Learning Lab, Center for Cancer Research and Cell Biology, School of Medicine, Dentistry and Biomedical Sciences, Queen’s University Belfast, 97 Lisburn Road, Belfast BT9 7BL, UK
Abstract:In this paper we study the influence of interventions on self-interactions in a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a two-dimensional grid with periodic boundary conditions and synchronous updating of the dynamics. We investigate two different types of self-interaction modifications. The first type (FSIP) is deterministic, effecting each self-interaction of a player by a constant factor, whereas the second type (PSIP) performs a probabilistic interventions. Both types of interventions lead to a reduction of the payoff of the players and, hence, represent inhibiting effects. We find that a constant but moderate reduction of self-interactions has a very beneficial effect on the evolution of cooperators in the population, whereas probabilistic interventions on self-interactions are in general counter productive for the coexistence of the two different strategies.
Keywords:Evolutionary dynamics  Evolutionary game theory  Game theory  Prisoner&rsquo  s dilemma
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