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PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
引用本文:王先甲,刘伟兵.PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA[J].数学物理学报(B辑英文版),2009,29(2):456-464.
作者姓名:王先甲  刘伟兵
基金项目:The project supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (60574071)
摘    要:Game theory is extensively used to study strategy-making and actions of play- ers. The authors proposed an analysis method for study the evolutionary outcome and behaviors of players with preference in iterated prisoner's dilemma. In this article, a preference parameter k was introduced in the payoff matrix, wherein the value of k denotes the player's degree of egoism and altruism (preference). Then, a game-theoretic dynamical model was formulated using Birth-and-Death process. The authors studied how preference influences the evolutionary equilibrium and behaviors of players. The authors get the general results: egoism leads to defection, and altruism can make players build trust and maintain cooperation, and so, the hope of the Pareto optimal solution. In the end, the simulation experiments proved the efficiency of the method.

关 键 词:囚徒困境  偏好  Pareto最优解  演化  利他主义  利己主义  动力学模型  死亡过程

PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Wang Xianjia,Liu Weibing.PREFERENCE AND EVOLUTION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA[J].Acta Mathematica Scientia,2009,29(2):456-464.
Authors:Wang Xianjia  Liu Weibing
Institution:[1]Economics and Management School of Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China [2]Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
Abstract:Game theory, evolutionary game, prisoner's dilemma, Birth-and-Death process, preference
Keywords:Game theory  evolutionary game  prisoner's dilemma  Birth-and-Death process  preference
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