The Social Virtues: Two Accounts |
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Authors: | S Goldberg |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208-2214, USA |
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Abstract: | Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A
thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of
the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2)
even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge
are those she herself possesses. A social (or anti-individualistic) account of the social virtues, by contrast, denies one or both of these claims. I will offer some
reasons for thinking that the individualistic account is not acceptable, and that one or the other social account provides
a better understanding of the social virtues. The argument is not decisive, but it does suggest that the social dimension
of social epistemic virtues is not fully characterizable in individualistic terms. |
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