The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules |
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Authors: | Marilda Sotomayor |
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Institution: | 1. Departamento de Economia, Universidade de S?o Paulo, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908; Cidade Universitária, 05508-900, S?o Paulo, SP, Brazil
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Abstract: | A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised. |
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