| 不对称信息下序贯信贷决策问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 董小洪,王浣尘.不对称信息下序贯信贷决策问题研究[J].上海交通大学学报,1997,31(4):10-15. |
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| 作者姓名： | 董小洪 王浣尘 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国银行总行 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究了在不对称信息信贷市场中，当银行与贷款企业致力于发展长期信贷关系时，银行的序贯信贷决策问题。分析了银行所采取的序贯信贷决策对于克服企业道德危害的作用，并将单阶段信贷决策问题与序贯信贷决策问题进行了比较，得出了在一定条件下，序贯信贷决策比单阶段信贷决策的社会福利性有所提高的结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 不对称信息 序贯信贷决策 信贷 银行 社会福利性 |
Study on Sequential Credit Decision Making in a Credit Market with Asymmetric Information |
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| Dong Xiaohong,Wang Huanchen,Jin Wu.Study on Sequential Credit Decision Making in a Credit Market with Asymmetric Information[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,1997,31(4):10-15. |
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| Authors: | Dong Xiaohong Wang Huanchen Jin Wu |
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| Institution: | Institute of Systems Engineering |
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| Abstract: | The bank's sequential credit decision making,when a bank and a firm are working for deve loping their long term relationship in a credit market with asymmetric information,is studied.It's effort to get rid of moral hazard is analyzed.Compared with the single period credit decision,it is concluded that the sequential decision enhances the social welfare. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information moral hazard incentive compatibility sequential credit decision |
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