On the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions. Each of player I and player II has a gun with two bullets and he can fire his bullets at any time in 0, 1] aiming at his opponent. The first bullet of player I and the second bullet of player II are noisy, and the second bullet of player I and the first bullet of player II are silent. It is assumed that both players have equal accuracy functions. If player I hits player II, not being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, not hitting player II before, the payoff is ?1. The value of the game and the optimal strategies are obtained. We find that the firing time of the silent bullet by player II's optimal strategy depends directly on the firing time of player I's noisy bullet.