政府协调下群体性突发事件的演化博弈分析及应用

在群体性突发事件应急处置过程中,政府处置不当会使得事态扩大,甚至由非利益直接相关者转变为矛盾冲突方。本文将政府部门视为社会矛盾的调解者,运用演化博弈理论分析了政府作为利益协调者在群体性突发事件中的重要作用,并结合对公平因素的考虑,详细分析了一些主要参数对决策行为的影响。结果表明,政府提早介入、公平的利益再分配以及适当的惩罚措施有助于减少群体性突发事件。最后,通过分析案例“重庆市出租车罢工事件”的发展演化历程及政府的协调作用,说明了本文模型的适用性。

Evolutionary Game Analysis and Application to Mass Emergency under Government Coordination

Mass emergencies will be worse if the government disposes them improperly. Even the identity will transfer from non-interest coordinators to conflict parties. In this paper, with the evolutionary game theory, we analyze the importance of the government as a coordinator in emergencies. And under the principle of fairness, particular analysis of some key parameters on the decision-making behavior is described. The results show that the goverument's early intervention, along with fair redistribution of benefits and appropriate penalties, will help to reduce the harm of mass emergencies. Finally, along with the analysis of the evolutionary process of the case “Taxi strike in Chongqing” and the government's coordination, it illustrates the applicability of our model.