Random order coalition structure values |
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Authors: | Prof. R. P. McLean |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, RUTCOR, Rutgers University, New Jersey Hall, 08903-5055, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
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Abstract: | Recently, attention has been focused on generalizations of the Shapley value obtained by relaxing the symmetry postulate. Shapley defined the class of weighted values and these have been characterized by Kalai and Samet. Random order values, treated by Weber, provide the most general approach to values without symmetry. This paper extends the random order idea to games with coalition structures. The symmetric CS value was defined by Owen; axiomatic characterizations have been given by Owen and Hart and Kurz. Levy and McLean extended their work and analyzed various classes of weighted CS values. The random order CS values of this paper include all the CS values described above as special cases. |
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