IPO市场条件下风险投资退出时机的抉择

本文利用博弈论和信息经济学的理论知识。通过建立一个两阶段基本模型，给出了风险企业的退出条件。由于风险投资家要重复地参与资本市场。又将两阶段模型推广到无限期重复博弈，通过建立声誉机制可解决不同类型风险企业的退出时机问题。对低质量的企业继续增加投资的目的不是为了建立声誉，而是为了增加收益。对年轻的风险投资家而言，要建立自己的声誉可通过使企业价格偏低来实现。

The Exit Timing of Venture Capital in Initial Public Offering

According to the theory of game and information economics, the paper sets up a two-staged basic model, and gives conditions of disinvestment. Due to venture capitalists repeatedly coming to venture market, we extend two-staged model to repeated game without stage limit, the dilemma of disinvestment time may be resolved via a reputation-acquiring mechanism in a repeated game. Furthermore, investment in firms with low-quality is for payoff, not for reputation. Finally, we show that young venture capitalists may use underpricing as a device for making themselves acquire reputation and maximize their payoffs in the future.