Retracing our steps: Fodor’s new old way with concept acquisition |
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Authors: | John Sarnecki |
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Institution: | (1) Philosophy, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Sutton Hall, Room 452, 1011 South Drive, Indiana, PA 15705, USA |
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Abstract: | The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper,
I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents.
In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition
that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He
must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt a rational causal model of concept acquisition. His animus towards the latter
dictates, in my view, a return to the nativism with which he began. |
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