| 管制者与管制企业的定价博弈:一个双赢策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 周勇,侯震梅. 管制者与管制企业的定价博弈:一个双赢策略[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2008, 38(15) |
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| 作者姓名： | 周勇 侯震梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 新疆财经大学统计信息学院,乌鲁木齐,830012 |
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| 摘 要： | 管制企业为了利润最大化倾向于定价高于成本较多,而管制者为了社会福利最大化期望管制企业的定价等于成本.考虑管制企业与管制者间的定价博弈问题.通过对问题的仔细分析,得到了在成本信息不对称情况下管制企业与管制者间关于定价博弈的一个双赢定价策略.最后给出了一个数值算例.
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| 关 键 词： | 成本信息不对称 管制企业 管制者 定价博弈 双赢定价策略 |
The Pricing Games Between the Regulated Enterprises and the Regulator Under Asymmetric Information:a Both Sides win Policy |
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| ZHOU Yong,HOU Zhen-mei. The Pricing Games Between the Regulated Enterprises and the Regulator Under Asymmetric Information:a Both Sides win Policy[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2008, 38(15) |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Yong HOU Zhen-mei |
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| Abstract: | The regulated enterprises is fond of pricing higher than the cost much for his profits,while the regulator expect that the pricing of the regulated enterprises is equal to the cost for the social benefits.Consider the problem of pricing games between the regulated enterprises and the regulator.A both sides win policy is obtained under the case of asymmetric information between the regulated enterprises and the regulator via carefully analysis.Finally,an example of computation is provided. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information regulated enterprise regulator pricing games both sides win policy |
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