Qualia and the Argument from Illusion: A Defence of Figment |
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Authors: | Andrew Bailey |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, The University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1, Canada |
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Abstract: | This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might
have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours
and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that
are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness
must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels ‘figment,’ but this result—though metaphysically and
epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics.
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Keywords: | " target="_blank"> Transparency Representationalism Intentionalism Consciousness Physicalism Qualia Illusion |
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