基于不同融资方式的双渠道供应链定价决策

针对由一个制造商和一个有资金约束零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统,利用Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商分别选择银行贷款和延迟支付解决资金约束问题时,不同定价方案中制造商和零售商的最优决策,分析零售渠道市场份额以及融资利率对决策结果的影响。研究表明:零售商的资金不足不会改变各参与方最优决策随零售渠道市场份额的变化趋势。在双渠道不统一定价方案下,若选择银行贷款,只有零售渠道市场份额较小且利率较高时,直销价格随利率的增加而增加;若申请延迟支付,零售价格和直销价格不受利率影响。在双渠道统一定价方案下,销售价格只有在零售渠道市场份额较低时随银行贷款利率的增加而增加,与延迟支付利率无关。

Pricing Decisions of Dual-channel Supply Chain Based on Different Financing Methods

We consider a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacture as the leader, and one budget constraint retailer as the follower. We obtain the optimal pricing decisions by building Stackelberg game models on the basis of different pricing schemes when the retailer respectively uses bank credit and delay in payment to solve the funding problem, and then analyze the impacts of retail market share and interest rates on the results. We find that, the variation tendency of decision outcomes with the retail market share is consistent with different financing methods. When the prices in dual channel are not unified, the direct price will increase with the interest rate of bank loan if the retail market share is relatively large and the interest rate is relatively high. Meanwhile, the retail price and the direct price are not affected by the interest rate of delay in payment. When the prices of dual channel are unified, the selling price will increase with the interest rate of bank loan if the retail market share is relatively small. Also, it is not associated with the interest rate of delay in payment.