Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation

In order to investigate the role of asymmetric spillovers in the stability of R&D cooperation, this paper distinguishes two different types of cooperative partners, and uses a game theory approach to reveal the relationship between asymmetric spillovers and R&D investment in the horizontally and vertically related R&D cooperation. In the horizontal R&D cooperation, higher incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers induce firms to invest on R&D efforts as agreed. However, it is the contradiction between horizontal firms’ attitudes towards asymmetric spillovers that leads to the inherent instability of the cooperation. In the vertical R&D cooperation, our results question the usually held opinion about the effects of asymmetric spillovers on the decision of R&D investment. The incoming spillovers are less important in the innovation process for vertically related R&D cooperation. A firm tends to under-invest on the arranged level of R&D efforts when its incoming spillovers increase. Our results also show that efficient mechanisms to restrain firms’ non-cooperative behavior are essential to improve the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation.