Values for strategic games in which players cooperate |
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| Authors: | Luisa Carpente Balbina Casas-Méndez Ignacio García-Jurado Anne van den Nouwel |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Departamento de Matemáticas. Facultade de Informática, Universidade da Coruña, 15071 A Coruña, Spain;(2) Departamento de Estatística e IO. Facultade de Matemáticas, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain;(3) Department of Economics, 435 PLC, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA;(4) Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Australia |
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| Abstract: | In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games and finite two-player zero-sum games, respectively.The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, FEDER andXunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson as well as an anonymous referee for useful comments. |
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| Keywords: | Value Lower value Matrix games Strategic games Coalitional games |
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