Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms |
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Authors: | Gustavo Bergantiños Juan Vidal-Puga |
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Institution: | 1. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Económicas, Universidade de Vigo, 36310 Vigo, Spain;2. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Ciencias Sociais, Campus A Xunqueira, 36005 Pontevedra, Spain |
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Abstract: | In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism. Moreover, this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007a. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 326–352]. |
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Keywords: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems Implementation |
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