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Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values |
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| Authors: | Gadi Fibich Arieh Gavious |
| Institution: | 1. School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel;2. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Ben-Gurion University, P.O. Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel |
| Abstract: | We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric auctions Interdependent values Perturbation analysis Revenue equivalence |
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