Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats |
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Authors: | Bhaskar Dutta |
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Affiliation: | Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi-110029, India |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we examine the manipulability properties of social decision rules which select a non-empty subset of the set of alternatives. Assuming that if an individual prefers x to y, then he prefers the outcome set {x, y} to {y}, and also {x} to {x, y}, we show that a wide class of scf's which allow ties even in pairwise choice violates one of the weakest notions of strategyproofness — a single individual can profitably misrepresent his preferences, even when he takes into account the possibility of countercoalitions. This class of scf's also violates exact consistency — no equilibrium situation gives the same outcome set as the ‘true profile’. |
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Keywords: | manipulability multivalued social choice function consistency |
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