Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory,part I: Theoretical preliminaries |
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Authors: | John C Harsanyi |
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Institution: | School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | Part I of this paper discusses the problem of how to model bargaining behavior, and outlines a few basic ideas of the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. In particular, we discuss removal of imperfect equilibrium points from the game by using the uniformly perturbed game form. We also describe definition of the solution in terms of payoff-dominance and risk-dominance relations, and in terms of the net strategic distances, between the primitive equilibrium points. Part II of the paper will discuss the actual solutions our theory provides for some important classes of bargaining games. |
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Keywords: | Harsanyi-Selten solution bargaining game risk dominance Nash equilibrium |
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