首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Cores of partitioning games
Authors:Mamoru Kaneko  Myrna Holtz Wooders
Institution:Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan;Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
Abstract:A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N of players, there is an a priori given set π of coalitions of N and only coalitions in π play an essential role. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the cores of all games with essential coalitions π are developed. These conditions appear extremely restrictive. However when N is ‘large’, there are relatively few ‘types’ of players, and members of π are ‘small’ and defined in terms of numbers of players of each type contained in subsets, then approximate cores are nonempty.
Keywords:Assignment game  partitioning game  nonempty core  approximate core  replication
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号