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制度下监督机构和特权者在灰色收入下的博弈分析
引用本文:庄新英,孙绍荣,宋玉强.制度下监督机构和特权者在灰色收入下的博弈分析[J].上海理工大学学报,2012,34(4):377-380.
作者姓名:庄新英  孙绍荣  宋玉强
作者单位:上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目,上海市教委科研创新重点资助项目,上海市重点学科建设资助项目,上海市社会科学基金资助项目
摘    要:由于制度不健全产生的灰色收入是引起当前基尼系数不断攀升的原因之一.根据当前实际数据,对国内外特权者和监督机构进行了研究,总结了当前灰色收入对社会产生的不良影响和治理对策,建立了特权者和监督机构之间的博弈行为模型,对灰色收入产生的原因进行了定量化研究和定性分析,归纳了灰色收入屡禁不止的原因,以期从制度角度找到能使收受灰色收入现象最大化减少的行为准则.

关 键 词:灰色收入  博弈  监督力度  惩罚力度

Game Analysis of Supervising Organization and Privilegers under Gray Income
ZHUANG Xin ying,SUN Shao rong and SONG Yu qiang.Game Analysis of Supervising Organization and Privilegers under Gray Income[J].Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology,2012,34(4):377-380.
Authors:ZHUANG Xin ying  SUN Shao rong and SONG Yu qiang
Institution:(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
Abstract:One of the reasons for rapidly rising of Gini coefficient is lack of well-developed system.Summurizing the bad effects of gray income and countermeasures against it based on the data and research results of scholars,the game model of supervising organization and privilegers under gray income was established.The causes of gray income were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively.The rules to maximally reduce the gray income were tried to achieve.
Keywords:gray income  game  supervising power  punishment level
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