独立董事的信号作用博弈模型

为了探讨独立董事在我国上市公司中的作用和运作机制,本文构建了一个博弈模型,来反应在大股东与市场上的出资人之间的博弈中,独立董事所发挥的间接的信号作用.模型中,由于出资人不能区分公司大股东是否有侵吞中小股东资产的意图,在没有任何信号（包括独立董事制度）的情况下,无侵吞意图的公司的资产会被低估,而有侵吞意图的公司则会被高估.无侵吞意图的大股东有可能通过聘请较多的独立董事来将自己和有侵吞意图的公司区分开来,使得高的独立董事比例成为一个正的信号,向出资人显示自己没有侵吞中小股东资产的意图.

A Signaling Model of Independent Directors

This paper aims at understanding the function and mechanism of independent directors in Chinese listed companies. We present a signaling model, in which independent director may sever as a signal for the initially unobservable quality of corporate controlling shareholder. In the model, investors can not observe whether the controlling shareholder has the intention to expropriate minority shareholders. So a high quality company, whose controlling shareholder has no expropriate intention, may be undervalued while a low quality company may be overvalued. A high quality controlling shareholder may hire more independent directors to separate herself from fhe low quality one, with high proportion of independent directors as a signal for having no intention to expropriate minority shareholders.