On an application of game theory to a problem of testing statistical hypothesis

Consider an-dimensional random vector with known covariance matrix. The expectation values of its single components may take arbitrary values subject to the restriction that their sum is a prescribed positive constant. Now choose a linear combination of these components, take its expectation value and divide this by the square root of its variance. This quotient, which is of importance in some problems of test theory serves as the pay-off function of a two-person zero-sum game. Player I wants to maximize the quotient by forming suitable linear combinations and player II wants to minimize it by choosing appropriate expectation values of the single components of the random vector subject to the restriction stated above. It is shown that the game possesses an essentially unique equilibrium point. In the more complicated case, when the strategies of the second player are confined to non-negative expectation values of the random vector's components, there is also an essentially unique equilibrium point of the game. It coincides with that one of the unconstrained case if and only if the row sums of the random vector's covariance matrix are all nonnegative.