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A note on the value of zero-sum sequential repeated games with incomplete information
Authors:Dr. S. Sorin
Affiliation:1. Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Université Paris 6, 4 Place Jussieu, F-75230, Paris Cedex 05
Abstract:We consider repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on both sides. If the one shot game is played sequentially, it is proved that the sequencev n is monotonic,v n being the value of then shot game. Moreover the speed of convergence is bounded byK/n, and this is the best bound.
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