| 企业生产安全投入与监管的演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 冯领香,李书全,陈向上. 企业生产安全投入与监管的演化博弈[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2012, 42(8): 76-84 |
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| 作者姓名： | 冯领香 李书全 陈向上 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津财经大学 商学院,天津,300222
2. 河北工业大学 土木工程学院,天津,300401 |
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| 基金项目： | 天津市哲学社会科学规划重点项目，天津财经大学科研发展基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对企业生产安全控制问题,建立企业与政府安全生产主管部门之间的博弈模型,利用演化博弈理论的多总体复制子动态方程,给出了企业安全投入与政府监管在博弈互动中的群体演化选择趋势,揭示了经济参数对演化博弈过程的影响规律.研究表明:企业安全投入成本C、企业无安全投入导致的经济损失F、政府安全监管成本D、政府不作为的损失G等经济参数对博弈双方的策略选择有重要影响,特别是C与F、D与G的大小关系,直接决定企业与政府的演化博弈规律,当F>C且G>D时,形成循环的演化博弈趋势,最有利于政府对企业生产安全进行监管.C/F和D/G分别为安全生产社会环境对企业安全投入和政府监管行为产生抑制或促进作用的群体选择总体比例临界值.
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| 关 键 词： | 安全投入 演化博弈 多总体复制子动态方程 经济参数 |
Evolution Game upon Enterprise Work Safety Investment & Regulation |
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| FENG Ling-xiang , LI Shu-quan , CHEN Xiang-shang. Evolution Game upon Enterprise Work Safety Investment & Regulation[J]. Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 2012, 42(8): 76-84 |
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| Authors: | FENG Ling-xiang LI Shu-quan CHEN Xiang-shang |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Business School,Tianjin University of Financial and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China) (2.College of Civil Engineering,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China) |
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| Abstract: | Game theory model is founded between enterprise and government according to enterprise work safey control.By means of multi-groups replicator dynamics modal of evolutionary game theory,the development about how the economic parameters effect the safety behavior of enterprise is analyzed.It is proved that the economic parameters,such as C,D,F,G,have great effect on the behavior of enterprise and government.Especially,if C/F and C/F is greater than 1 take important role in the evolution laws.F > C and G > D is beneficial to the government regulation on the enterprise safety investment because of the cycle evolutionary game.C/Fand-D/Gare the critical values in in the evolution selection. |
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| Keywords: | safety investment evolutionary game multi-groups replicator dnamics equation economic parameters |
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