Does “game participation cost” affect the advantage of heterogeneous networks for evolving cooperation? |
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Authors: | Jun Tanimoto Atsuo Yamauchi |
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Institution: | Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan |
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Abstract: | Masuda N. Masuda, Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation, Proceedings of the Royal Society B 274 (2007) 1815-1821] reported that a game participation cost (expressed by adding same negative values to all four elements in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix) affects the advantage of heterogeneous networks in the evolution of cooperation. We show that this finding is not always true depending on the features of the network, indicating that participation costs help cooperation in certain situations rather than destroy it. In a weaker dilemma game on a scale free network derived from the Barabasi & Albert algorithm with a larger average degree, game participation cost helps rather than destroy the network reciprocity. |
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Keywords: | 2  ×   2 dilemma game on network Game participation cost Heterogeneous network Scale-free network derived from Barabasi & Albert algorithm |
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