山寨危机和道德危机视角下的网红店铺行为规制研究

网红店铺在走红之后,极易在短时间内被模仿和山寨,而正牌店铺因为信息不对称、异地维权成本高等原因难以做出有效反应;另一方面在市场竞争中,网红店铺商品以次充好的现象亦有发生,因此网红店铺创始者面临着山寨危机和道德危机双重危机。基于此背景,本文研究了网红店铺的原创者和追随者与市场监管方的三方演化博弈问题。研究发现:对于网红店铺创始者和追随者来说,只有罚金数额足够大时才能起到有效的威慑作用阻止侵权和违规行为的发生。基于前景理论进一步讨论发现:随着罚金金额变化,创始者的风险态度会发生变化,并且文末求得了最优的罚款系数,并从加大执法力度和提高罚金金额两方面提出政策建议。

Research on the Regulation of Eye Candy Store Behavior from the Perspective of Counterfeit Crisis and Moral Crisis

With the eye candy stores becoming popular, it is easy for them to be imitated in a short time, and authentic shops find it difficult to respond effectively because of information asymmetry and high cost of defending rights from different places. On the other hand, with the market competition intensified , selling second-handed goods at the best quality prices has also occurred, so the founders of eye candy stores have faced both the counterfeit crisis and moral one. Against this background, this paper studies the three-party evolutionary game of the originator and followers of the eye candy stores and the regulatory platform. The study finds that for the founders and followers of eye candy stores, only when the amount of fines is large enough can the regulator effectively prevent infringement and violation. Based on the prospect theory, further discussion finds that with the change of the amount of fines, the risk attitude of the founders is changed, and the optimal penalty level is obtained at the end of the paper, and policy recommendations are proposed from the aspects of increasing enforcement and amount of fines.