Revenue in contests with many participants |
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Authors: | Arieh Gavious Yizhaq Minchuk |
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Affiliation: | 1. Faculty of Business Administration, Ono Academic College, Israel;2. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, Israel;3. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Shamoon College of Engineering, Israel |
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Abstract: | We show that in a contest with a single prize, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant bounds the sum of the expected efforts made by all of the participants with valuations less than the kth highest valuations. We also show that in the limit case of a contest with m prizes, the expected effort made by the kth highest valuation participant when the bidders are risk-neutral is greater than the expected effort in the risk-averse case. |
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Keywords: | Contest All-pay auction Revenue Risk aversion |
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