Models of the universe

In this paper a theory of models of the universe is proposed. We refer to such models ascosmological models, where a cosmological model is defined as an Einstein-inextendible Einstein spacetime. A cosmological model isabsolute if it is a Lorentz-inextendible Einstein spacetime,predictive if it is globally hyperbolic, andnon-predictive if it is nonglobally-hyperbolic. We discuss several features of these models in the study of cosmology. As an example, any compact Einstein spacetime is always a non-predictive absolute cosmological model, whereas a noncompact complete Einstein spacetime is an absolute cosmological model which may be either predictive or non-predictive. We discuss the important role played by maximal Einstein spacetimes. In particular, we examine the possible proper Lorentz-extensions of such spacetimes, and show that a spatially compact maximal Einstein spacetime is exclusively either a predictive cosmological model or a proper sub-spacetime of a non-predictive cosmological model. Provided that the Strong Cosmic Censorship conjecture is true, a generic spatially compact maximal Einstein spacetime must be a predictive cosmological model. It isconjectured that the Strong Cosmic Censorship conjecture isnot true, and converting a vice to a virtue it is argued that the failure of the Strong Cosmic Censorship conjecture would point to what may be general relativity's greatest prediction of all, namely,that general relativity predicts that general relativity cannot predict the entire history of the universe.